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I. INTRODUCTION
An owner of real estate with an existing mortgage often conveys his equity
before he has fully paid the mortgage debt.' The grantee often agrees to
"assume" the mortgage or to take the property "subject to" the existing
mortgage. 2 Whether a grantee assumes the mortgage or takes the property
subject to the mortgage determines his personal liability for the mortgage
debt. Mortgage assumptions are popular because the buyer does not have
to obtain other financing for the property. This is particularly beneficial when
interest rates are higher than the rate on the existing mortgage. Reported
cases on this subject, however, have been infrequent since the depression
era. The lack of cases may be due to growth in real estate values during this
period, which has caused most land to be of sufficient value to satisfy any
mortgage debts at a foreclosure. If real estate values begin to decline, litigation
concerning this subject may increase unless enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses 3'by mortgagees results in fewer transfers without refinancing.
A conveyance in which the grantee takes subject to a mortgage4 differs
1. See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 5.1 (1979) (discussion ofpotential problems with these transactions).
2. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "mortgage," "mortgagee,"
and "mortgagor" are used interchangeably with "deed of trust," "beneficiary,"
and "grantor."
3. The due-on-sale clause is a part of many mortgage instruments and allows
the mortgagee to declare the entire mortgage due on a transfer of an interest in the
mortgaged land. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.21.
4. When a grantee takes subject to a mortgage, he will pay his grantor the
land's redemption value, which is the difference between the full unencumbered
value and the amount of the mortgage debt. The grantee is the party expected to
1
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from one in which the grantee assumes the mortgage. When land is con-
veyed subject to a mortgage, the grantor and grantee impliedly agree that,
between them, the land is the primary fund from which the mortgagee may
satisfy the debt. The grantee does not become personally liable for payment
of the debt to either the grantor or mortgagee. 5 Thus, the grantee has no
liability for payment of the mortgage beyond loss of the property. When a
grantee assumes the mortgage, not only does the land become the primary
fund from which to satisfy the mortgage debt, but the grantee becomes per-
sonally liable for payment of the mortgage debt. 6 Determining if a grantee
has assumed the mortgage debt, however, is often difficult. This Comment
will review the law in Missouri concerning the rights and liabilities of the
mortgagee, the mortgagor, and the mortgagor's grantee for payment of a
pre-existing mortgage debt when the grantee assumes the mortgage on the
real estate conveyed.
7
II. THE AGREEMENT TO ASSUME AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF
In addition to conveying real property, a deed may -be a contract be-
tween the grantor and the grantee.8 The grantee becomes bound on the con-
tract by his acceptance of a deed delivered by the grantor, even though a
deed is signed only by the grantor. 9 Thus, a deed containing an assump-
tion clause, 10 when accepted by the grantee, is usually an enforceable con-
pay the debt in order to retain the property. See id. § 5.3; Warm, Some Aspects of the
Rights and Liabilities of Mortgagee, Mortgagor and Grantee, 10 TEMP. L.Q. 116, 116-18
(1936).
The rights and liabilities of a grantee who takes subject to a mortgage are
beyond the scope of this Comment, except as they apply to assumption of mortgage
problems.
5. McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 984, 20 S.W.2d 63, 66(1929); Barnes
v. Ganss, 72 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Mo. App., St. L. 1934).
6. Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 887, 38 S.W.2d 1049,
1055 (1931); Heim v. Vogel, 69 Mo. 529, 535 (1879); Nutz v. Shepherd, 490
S.W.2d 366, 372 (Mo. App., Spr. 1973); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295
(Mo. App., Spr. 1963).
7. The right of a mortgagee to recover a deficiency remaining after foreclosure
has been recognized in Missouri at least since Scott v. Jackson, 2 Mo. 104 (1829).
8. Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884, 38 S.W.2d 1049,
1053 (1931); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963).
9. See Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1053 (1931). The Garrett court stated:
A deed, though signed by the grantor only, when delivered to and accepted
by the grantee, becomes a contract in writing. As the terms of the contract
are in writing the grantee's acceptance of the deed in which the contract
is set out, and of which it forms a part of the consideration, is considered
equivalent to the signature of the grantee to the contract.
Id.
10. No particular words are required to create a valid agreement to assume
[Vol. 47
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tract to assume the mortgage debt. On the other hand, the grantee is not
bound by an assumption clause when he can prove that he accepted the deed
without knowledge of the clause or that it was included in the deed by fraud
or mistake.1
An enforceable agreement to assume the mortgage may exist outside
the deed if the deed does not contain an assumption clause. 12 Courts may
find such an agreement when the deed of conveyance says nothing about
an existing mortgage or says that the grantee takes the property subject to
an existing mortgage.13 While the deed may recite that the grantee takes
subject to a mortgage, 14 courts have enforced both written and oral
agreements to assume the mortgage.' 5 An outside agreement to assume a
mortgage is found most commonly in a contract for sale of mortgaged land.'
6
Courts also have looked at the negotiations preceding the sale to find a bind-
ing oral agreement to assume the mortgage.' 7
Courts sometimes will imply an agreement to assume when a contract
for sale or the deed recites that the purchaser takes subject to a mortgage
but says nothing about whether the purchaser agreed to assume the mort-
gage. A court may find an implied promise by the purchaser to assume the
mortgage when the deed or contract of sale states that the unencumbered
value of the property is the consideration, but the purchaser paid the dif-
a mortgage. See McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 986, 20 S.W.2d 63, 67 (1929).
Probably the most common words used are that the grantee "assumes" or "assumes
and agrees to pay" the mortgage debt. See Annot., 101 A.L.R. 281 (1936).
11. Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884-85, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1053-54 (1931); Laudman v. Ingram, 49 Mo. 212, 214 (1872); Hafford v.
Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963); Wissmann v. Pearline,
235 Mo. App. 314, 320-22, 135 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (St. L. 1940). For a discussion of
the parol evidence problems presented when a grantee attempts to prove he did not
assume the mortgage, see notes 24-33 and accompanying text infra.
12. For a discussion of the parol evidence problems associated with proving
that an agreement to assume exists outside the deed, see notes 34-39 and accom-
panying text infra.
13. For cases in which the deed was silent concerning the existing mortgage,
see Laudman v. Ingram, 49 Mo. 212, 213 (1872); Heffernan v. Weir, 99 Mo. App.
301, 303-04, 72 S.W. 1085, 1085 (St. L. 1903). For cases in which the deed recited
that the grantee took subject to the mortgage, see McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo.
977, 988-89, 20 S.W.2d 63, 64-65 (1929); Hall v. Morgan, 79 Mo. 47, 52 (1883);
Gilmer v. Powell, 256 S.W. 124, 124-25 (Mo. App., K.C. 1923).
14. See note 4 supra.
15. See Missouri Home Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Allen, 452 S.W.2d 109, 110-12
(Mo. 1970) (written agreement); McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 987-88, 20
S.W.2d 63, 64-65 (1929) (oral agreement); Gilmer v. Powell, 256 S.W. 124, 124-25
(Mo. App., K.C. 1923) (written agreement).
16. See cases cited note 15 supra.
17. McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 987-88, 20 S.W.2d 63, 67 (1929)
(binding agreement not proven).
1982]
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ference between the unencumbered value of the land and the amount of the
indebtedness. Courts reason that the parties intended the grantee to pay the
unencumbered value of the land and that the amount of the indebtedness,
which the purchaser retained, is purchase money that belongs to the
grantor." For example, S agrees to sell Blackacre, which has an unen-
cumbered value of $40,000, to B. Blackacre is subject to a $30,000 mortgage.
If the deed from S to B recites a consideration of $40,000 and states that B
takes subject to the $30,000 mortgage, but the evidence shows that B paid
only $10,000 to S for the conveyance, the court may imply that B promised
to assume the $30,000 mortgage. The court theorizes that B'has retained
the $30,000, which belongs to S, in exchange for B's promise to pay the mort-
gage.
Many scholars have criticized this theory.' 9 They argue that in arriv-
ing at the purchase price for encumbered land, the parties will determine
the land's unencumbered market value, from which they will deduct the
amount of the encumbrance. In the above example, the scholars would argue
that B paid $10,000 of the $40,000 value of Blackacre not because he assumed
the $30,000 mortgage, but because $10,000 represented the value of the in-
terest that B received; to conclude that B assumed the mortgage is myopic.
B may have assumed the mortgage or he may have taken subject to the mort-
gage; either finding would be consistent with these facts.
20
The practitioner should be aware of this theory because it is unclear
whether Missouri courts would find an implied promise to assume a mort-
gage if presented with the facts of the foregoing example.21 The practitioner
18. See id.; G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.8;
Warm, supra note 4, at 119-21.
19. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.8; Warm,
supra note 4, at 119-21.
20. See authorities cited note 19 supra.
21. Some scholars have stated that Missouri courts have applied this theory.
See, e.g., Warm, supra note 4, at 119 n.10. A careful examination, however, reveals
that no Missouri court has found an implied assumption under these facts. The cases
often cited as following the theory in Missouri are distinguishable. See McFarland
v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 986-87, 20 S.W.2d 63, 67 (1929) ("We do not agree that
... an agreement should be implied therefrom.., for in every ordinary purchase
of an equity [of tardy redemption] the process necessarily involved in ascertaining
its value is to deduct the amount of the incumbrance from the worth of the interest
covered.") (citations omitted). The McFarland court concluded that the parties' in-
tent determines if the grantee assumed the debt. Id. In other words, the agreement
to assume is not implied, but must be proven by the use of parol evidence. Landau
v. Cottril, 159 Mo. 308, 60 S.W. 64 (1900), is sometimes cited as authority that
Missouri follows this theory. There is dictum in Landau indicating that the court
would imply an assumption based on the grantee's payment of only the unen-
cumbered value of the land. Id. at 318, 60 S.W. at 66 (dictum). In Landau, the defen-
dant purchased the property in question subject to the plaintiff-mortgagee's mort-
gage and subject to a mechanic's lien. The property then was sold to satisfy the
[Vol. 47
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can avoid the risk that a court would imply an assumption of a mortgage
by careful drafting of the contract of sale and the deed. 22 One treatise has
suggested that "where an assumption is not intended the drafter could in-
clude after the 'subject' to language, the following language: 'Said mort-
gage is not being assumed by the Grantee.' "23
Courts often must decide if parol evidence is admissible to prove or to
disprove the existence of an agreement to assume the mortgage. The cases
admitting parol evidence fall into two categories. First, when the deed of
conveyance contains an assumption clause, parol evidence is admissible to
prove the grantee did not agree to assume the debt. 24 Second, when the deed
of conveyance says nothing about the mortgage or says that the grantee takes
the property subject to the mortgage, parol evidence is admissible to prove
there was an agreement to assume the debt. 25 Missouri courts have recog-
nized that the use of parol evidence in these situations does not compare with
conceptualizing the deed as a contract.
26
Missouri courts have held consistently that parol evidence is admissi-
mechanic's lien, and the defendant was the purchaser at that sale. When the
plaintiff-mortgagee's notes matured, he sought foreclosure and sale of the proper-
ty. The defendant claimed that he had superior title to the plaintiff under the sheriff's
deed he acquired at the mechanic's lien sale. Id. at 313-14, 60 S.W. at 64-65. Thus,
the issue was not one of the grantee's personal liability for the debt, but whether
the mortgagee's interest was superior to the grantee's interest and whether the mor-
tgagee could foreclose on the property in the hands of the grantee who took subject
to the mortgage. Id. at 318, 60 S.W. at 66. Gilmer v. Powell, 256 S.W. 124 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1923), contains dictum that indicates the court implied an assumption
by use of this theory. In Gilmer, the court stated, "The contract to assume the deed
of trust was properly proven by parol." Id. at 125. In Gerardi v. Christie, 148 Mo.
App. 75, 127 S.W. 635 (St. L. 1910), a written agreement outside the deed was
introduced to show that the grantee had agreed to assume the mortgage.
22. See Peterson & Eckhardt, Legal Forms, 6 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES
708 (1960).
23. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.8, at 261.
24. See Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884-85, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1054 (1931); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Mo. App., Spr.
1963); Wissmann v. Pearline, 235 Mo. App. 314, 318-20, 135 S.W.2d 1, 5 (St.
L. 1940); Empire Trust Co. v. Hitchcock, 233 Mo. App. 581, 588, 123 S.W.2d
565, 567-68 (K.C. 1939). See generally Annot., 143 A.L.R. 548 (1943).
25. See Missouri Home Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Allen, 452 S.W.2d 109, 111-12
(Mo. 1970); McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 984-85, 20 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1929);
Laudman v. Ingram, 49 Mo. 212, 213-14 (1872); Morris v. Holland, 529 S.W.2d
948, 952-53 (Mo. App., Spr. 1975); Heffernan v. Weir, 99 Mo. App. 301, 304-05,
72 S.W. 1085, 1085 (St. L. 1903). See generally Annot., 143 A.L.R. 548 (1943).
26. See McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 985, 20 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1929)
("[I]t must be and is recognized the question involves going outside the deed and
enforcing an agreement which is at least in some measure at variance with the terms
of the instrument as a contract, if not as an operative conveyance.").
1982]
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ble to show whether the grantee agreed to assume the mortgage when the
deed contains an assumption clause but the grantee denies that he agreed
to assume the mortgage debt. Courts allow parol evidence when the grantee
claims the assumption clause was inserted in the deed either without his
knowledge27 or by fraud or mistake. 28 Courts have treated grantees' claims
based on lack of knowledge differently than claims based on fraud or mistake,
even though these concepts are closely related. Depending on the theory used,
the courts treat the grantee as bound or not bound by the assumption clause. 29
Courts treat the grantee as initially bound by the assumption clause when
he contends the clause was inserted in the deed by fraud or mistake; the
remedy available is reformation or rescission of the deed.30 On the other
hand, courts treat the grantee as not bound by the assumption clause when
he contends the clause was inserted in the deed without his knowledge.3 1
The theory is that acceptance of the deed by the grantee without knowledge
of the assumption clause does not result in a contract binding the grantee
to pay the mortgage debt.32 When applying this theory, courts admit parol
evidence to determine if the grantee had agreed to assume the mortgage prior
to execution of the deed. 33
Missouri courts admit parol evidence to prove that an agreement to
assume the mortgage existed outside the deed when the deed says nothing
about the mortgage 34 or says that the grantee takes the property subject to
the mortgage. 35 Parol evidence is admissible to show either a written or an
oral agreement to assume the mortgage.3 6 Missouri courts have used three
27. See Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963);
Wissmann v. Pearline, 235 Mo. App. 314, 318-20,135 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (St. L. 1940).
28. See Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884-85, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1054 (1931).
29. It is unclear which factors influence a court to treat a case as one of fraud
or mistake or as one of lack of knowledge. Compare cases cited note 30 infra with cases
cited note 31 infra. For an excellent discussion of this area, see generally Comment,
Reformation of Written Instruments in Missouri, 37 MO. L. REV. 54 (1972).
30. See Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 884-87, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1053-54(1931); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 296-97 (Mo. App., Spr.
1963).
31. See Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963);
Wissmann v. Pearline, 235 Mo. App. 314, 318-20, 135 S.W.2d 1,4-5 (St. L. 1940);
Empire Trust Co. v. Hitchcock, 233 Mo. App. 581, 588-89, 123 S.W.2d 565, 568
(K.C. 1939).
32. Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963) ("Accept-
ance and recording of the deed containing the assumption clause, without more,
does not bind the grantee .... ).
33. See id. at 296-97; Wissmann v. Pearline, 235 Mo. App. 314, 320, 135
S.W.2d 1, 5 (St. L. 1940).
34. See cases cited note 13 supra.
35. See cases cited note 13 supra.
36. See cases cited note 15 supra.
[Vol. 47
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theories to allow the admission of parol evidence.3 7 The first one is that "a
stranger to a written instrument is not forbidden to dispute its terms.' 38 Sec-
ond, "an agreement to assume is an independent contract, and ... parol
proof... is merely explanatory of the consideration." 39 The third theory
is that "the execution of the deed and delivery of possession by the grantor
constitute performance on one side such as takes the alleged oral agreement
to assume out of the statute of frauds and opens the way for proof thereof."40
Under any of these three theories, the existence of an agreement to assume
the mortgage debt is a question of fact, which courts have required to be
established by clear and convincing evidence.4 1
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT TO ASSUME
A. Liability of the Assuming Grantee to the Mortgagee
Missouri courts uniformly recognize the right of the mortgagee to sue
an assuming grantee directly for a deficiency existing after foreclosure. 42 In
other words, the mortgagee can hold the assuming grantee personally liable
for an amount left unpaid on the debt after applying the value of the land
against the indebtedness. The action is based on the grantee's promise to
the mortgagor to assume payment of the mortgage debt. 43 Because the assum-
ing grantee contracts with the mortgagor and not with the mortgagee, a mort-
gagee wishing to sue the assuming grantee must avoid the usual require-
ment of privity of contract. 44 Missouri courts, however, have avoided this
37. McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 984-85, 20 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1929).
Seegenerally Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580, 588, 41 S.W. 960, 962 (1897); Laclede
Laundry Co. v. Freudenstein, 179 Mo. App. 175, 161 S.W. 593 (St. L. 1913).
38. McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 984-85, 20 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1929).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 985, 20 S.W.2d at 66; Morris v. Holland, 529 S.W.2d 948, 952-53
(Mo. App., Spr. 1975); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Mo. App., Spr.
1963).
42. See, e.g., Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963)
("Whether the relationship between mortgagor and assuming grantee be considered
one of suretyship, or a simple third-party beneficiary contract, the mortgagee may
proceed directly against the vendee."). For present purposes, the discussion will
be confined to the situation where there has been only one conveyance of the mor-
tgaged property, i.e., where the only parties are the mortgagee, mortgagor, and
the assuming grantee. For a discussion of the liability of a grantee who assumes
the mortgage in a more remote conveyance, see Part III.C. infra.
43. Employers Indem. Corp. v. Garrett, 327 Mo. 874, 877-78, 38 S.W.2d
1049, 1053 (1931); Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963);
Phoenix Trust Co. v. Garner, 227 Mo. App. 929, 932, 59 S.W.2d 779, 780 (K.C.
1933).
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doctrine by applying either principles of suretyship and the doctrine of
equitable subrogation or a third party beneficiary theory. 45 Although the
precise status of these doctrines in Missouri is uncertain, the trend is toward
more frequent use of the third party beneficiary theory. 46 Some Missouri
decisions, however, have recognized the suretyship-equitable subrogation
theory, while others are unclear about which theory they have followed.
4 7
The suretyship-equitable subrogation theory begins with the principle
that a transfer of the mortgaged premises will not relieve the mortgagor of
his liability to the mortgagee on the note.48 When the grantee assumes the
mortgage indebtedness, the relationship of principal debtor and surety is
created between the assuming grantee and the mortgagor. 49 The grantee
becomes the principal debtor, and the mortgagor becomes his surety. If the
grantee defaults, the mortgagee can sue the mortgagor-surety on the mort-
gate note.5 0 Should the mortgagor-surety be forced to pay the debt, he can
sue the assuming grantee for reimbursement. 51 The doctrine of equitable
subrogation, however, bypasses this circuity and gives the mortgagee the
right of the mortgagor to recover directly from the assuming grantee.5 2 This
theory was recognized in early Missouri decisions.
53
45. Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo. 262, 268-70, 55 S.W. 863, 863-64 (En Banc
1900) (third party beneficiary theory allowing recovery); Fitzgerald v. Barker, 70
Mo. 685, 687-88 (1879) (same); Heim v. Vogel, 69 Mo. 529, 535 (1879) (same);
Hafford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963) (mortgagee can
recover whether under suretyship theory or third party beneficiary theory).
46. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.12, at
269-70. The majority of Missouri cases employs the third party beneficiary theory.
See, e.g., cases cited note 45 supra.
47. See Hicks v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 495, 499, 46 S.W. 432, 432-33 (1898)
(overruled in Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo. 262, 55 S.W. 863 (En Banc 1900)); Haf-
ford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963).
48. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.1.
49. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 609-10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916);
Calloway v. McKnight, 180 Mo. App. 621, 624-26, 163 S.W. 932, 933 (St. L.
1914). While the courts talked in terms of principal and surety, the relationship
may be more accurately referred to as one of quasi-suretyship wherein the land is
the principal debtor, the assuming grantee is a surety, and the mortgagor is a sub-
surety. Seegmerally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, §§ 5.14,
5.19; Warm, supra note 4, at 126-27. For purposes of convenience and because the
courts use these terms, this Comment will refer to the assuming grantee as the "prin-
cipal" and the mortgagor, as a "surety," when discussing the suretyship
relationship.
50. See Part III.B. infra.
51. A surety is entitled to reimbursement after he has made a good faith
discharge of the mortgage debt. Tucker v. Holder, 359 Mo. 1039, 1045-46, 225
S.W.2d 123, 125-26 (1949).
52. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.13, at 272.
53. See Hicks v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 495,499, 46 S.W. 432,432 (1898) (over-
[Vol. 47
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/5
ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGES
The basis of the third party beneficiary theory is that the assuming
grantee's performance of his promise to the mortgagor to discharge the debt
also will benefit the mortgagee. 54 The mortgagee is a creditor beneficiary
because the performance of the promise by the grantee will satisfy an obliga-
tion of the mortgagor to the mortgagee. As a creditor beneficiary, the mort-
gagee can sue the assuming grantee on the promise.55
B. Rights and Liabilities of the Mortgagor
Unless the mortgagee and the mortgagor's grantee execute a novation ,56
a mortgagor who has conveyed the mortgaged premises to an assuming
grantee remains liable on his note to the mortgagee.5 7 The courts apply
suretyship principles, making the assuming grantee the principal and the
mortgagor a surety. 5 The land, however, remains the primary fund for pay-
ment of the debt.5 9 Missouri courts require the mortgagee who has notice
of an assumption agreement to recognize the suretyship relationship and
to treat the assuming grantee as the principal debtor and the mortgagor as
the surety. 60
Although courts allow the mortgagee to sue the assuming grantee
directly, this requirement leaves unclear whether the mortgagee must sue
the assuming grantee before suing the mortgagor. In Missouri, following
default, the mortgagee may sue a surety on his promise to pay the debt
ruled on other grounds in Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo. 262, 55 S.W. 863 (1900)); Haf-
ford v. Smith, 369 S.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963).
54. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932). An incidental beneficiary
is one who will be benefitted by the performance of the promise, but the perform-
ance is not in satisfaction of an obligation of the promisee to him. An incidental
beneficiary cannot sue successfully on the promise. Id. See generally 4 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 772-781 (1951).
55. See cases cited note 45 supra. See also G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHIT-
MAN, supra note 1, § 5.12.
56. A novation is a binding agreement among all of the parties, whereby a
new party is substituted for one of the original parties to a contract. A novation
would relieve the mortgagor of any obligation on the mortgage and substitute the
assuming grantee in his place. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 423, 430
(1932). In lieu of releasing the mortgagor, the mortgagee may enter into a cove-
nant not to sue the mortgagor.
57. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.1.
58. See Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 609-10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916);
Calloway v. McKnight, 180 Mo. App. 621, 624-25 (St. L. 1914).
59. Greerv. Orchard, 175 Mo. App. 494,498, 161 S.W. 875,876 (Spr. 1913).
See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-.3.
60. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 610 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916).
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without first suing the principal debtor. 61 Missouri Revised Statutes section
433.01062 states:
Any person bound as surety for another in any bond, bill or note,
for the payment of money or delivery of property, may, at any time
after an action has accrued thereon, require, in writing, the person
having such right of action forthwith to commence suit against the
principal debtor and other parties liable.
This statute appears to govern the quasi-suretyship relationship present with
an assumption of a mortgage because Missouri courts require the mortgagee
to treat an assuming grantee as the principal debtor. 63 Thus, the statute would
allow the mortgagor-surety to require the mortgagee to sue for a deficiency
against the principal debtor-assuming grantee by serving the mortgagee with
written notice to commence suit.
64
Three defenses are available to the mortgagor in a suit for a deficiency.
When the mortgagor has given the mortgagee statutory notice to commence
suit, as discussed above, Missouri Revised Statutes section 433.03065 pro-
vides that if suit is not commenced within thirty days, the mortgagor is
released from liability. 66 When the mortgagee gives the assuming grantee
a binding extension of time for payment of the note without the consent of
the mortgagor or reservation of rights against the mortgagor, 67 the mortgagor
61. State exrel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Walsh, 540 S.W.2d 137,
140 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Stifel Estate Co. v. Cella, 220 Mo. App. 657, 665-67,
291 S.W. 515, 517-19 (St. L. 1927). The mortgagor is a surety and is bound by
the terms of the note and mortgage instrument. If the assuming grantee defaults,
the mortgagor is bound to perform according to the terms of the mortgage. The
mortgagee may sue either the mortgagor-surety or the assuming grantee, as prin-
cipal, or both jointly at his option. The obligation of the mortgagor as a surety should
be distinguished from the obligations of a guarantor in a guaranty contract. The
obligation of a guarantor and a surety are similar, but a guarantor is bound to per-
form by the terms of a separate contract and not by the contract between the prin-
cipal and the creditor. See Beauchamp v. North Am. Say. Ass'n, 543 S.W.2d 536,
537-38 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Walsh, 540 S.W.2d at 140; Stifel Estate Co. v. Cella, 220 Mo. App. at 665-67,
291 S.W. at 517-19.
62. (1978).
63. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 610 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916).
64. The author has found no cases interpreting the application of this statute
in the quasi-suretyship situation of an assumed mortgage.
65. (1978).
66. The mortgagor also may be released if the mortgagee fails to pursue the
suit diligently. MO. REV. STAT. § 433.030 (1978). The defenses provided by this
section are available to the mortgagor only if id. § 433.010 applies to an assumed
mortgage. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
67. MO. REV. STAT. § 400.3-606 (1978). An express reservation of rights
against a party preserves all rights against that party which the holder of the in-
strument had at the time the instrument was originally due. Id. § 400.3-606(2)(a).
[Vol. 47
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is discharged completely. 68 While some Missouri cases follow the above rule,
other cases have said that the mortgagor is released only to the extent of the
value of the property when the mortgagee gives the extension to the assum-
ing grantee. 69 The mortgagor also may be discharged when the mortgagee
releases either all or part of the property securing the debt or when he releases
the assuming grantee from personal liability on the debt. 70 This release may
effect a total discharge or a discharge to the extent of-the value of the premises
released.71
When the assuming grantee defaults and the mortgagor, on demand,
pays the mortgagee, the mortgagor can sue the assuming grantee on a con-
tract or a subrogation theory. First, he may sue on the contract of the assum-
ing grantee to pay the debt. 72 Second, relying on suretyship-equitable
subrogation principles, he may be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.
73
Although the theories appear distinct, courts sometimes do not distinguish
them. 74 In the usual situation, when the mortgagee has foreclosed and the
mortgagor has paid a deficiency only, the choice of theory would make lit-
tle difference. If the suit is on the contract, the mortgagor suffers no actual
damages until he has paid the deficiency; hence, he would not sue until he
has paid. Likewise, the mortgagor, as a surety, is not subrogated to the rights
of the mortgagee until he has paid the mortgagee and, therefore, could not
sue until he has paid. 75
The express reservation also preserves the right of the surety to pay the instrument
as of the time it is originally due, and he will be subrogated to the rights of the mort-
gagee against the principal debtor. Id. § 400.3-606(2)(b) to (c).
68. See Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291, 49 S.W. 1028 (1899); Phoenix Trust
Co. v. Garner, 227 Mo. App. 929, 59 S.W.2d 779 (K.C. 1933); G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.19.
69. McFarland v. Melson, 323 Mo. 977, 989, 20 S.W.2d 63, 68 (1929); G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.19, at 289-91.
70. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 609-10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916); G.
OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.19, at 292-93. Courts
generally apply suretyship rules in finding that a release by the mortgagee of the
assuming grantee discharges the mortgagor. Id. at 287, 292. See also Barnett, Alter-
native Mortgage Instruments: How to Maintain Secured Lender Status, 96 BANKING L.J.
6, 38-44 (1979).
71. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 609-10 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916)
(discharge to extent of value of release given); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.19, at 292-93. A full discharge has been given by some
courts that refused to determine the value of the portion of the property released
and thereby the extent of any injury to the mortgagor. Id.
72. Calloway v. McKnight, 180 Mo. App. 621, 622-23, 163 S.W. 932, 932
(St. L. 1914).
73. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 610 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916); Fuller v.
Devolld, 144 Mo. App. 93, 96-97, 128 S.W. 1011, 1012 (K.C. 1910).
74. See, e.g., Galloway v. McKnight, 180 Mo. App. 621, 622-23, 163 S.W.
932, 933 (St. L. 1914) (suit on contract but suretyship principles discussed).
75. Hildrith v. Walker, 187 S.W. 608, 610 (Mo. App., Spr. 1916).
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The theory of the cause of action is more important if there has been
no foreclosure before the mortgagor-surety pays the mortgagee because the
mortgaged property may be the only substantial asset from which to satisfy
any judgment obtained. The payment of the indebtedness secured by a mort-
gage usually extinguishes the encumbrance on the land. 76 It is unclear,
however, whether payment extinguishes the power of sale or right to
foreclosure and, if not, whether the mortgagor is subrogated to these rights. 77
The better approach would be that the mortgagor is subrogated to these rights
to prevent the assuming grantee from being unjustly enriched. 78 These prob-
lems may be avoided if the mortgagee assigns the mortgage to the mortgagor-
surety, an action that would prevent the mortgage from being satisfied of
record.
C. The Remote Assuming Grantee
An unbroken chain of assuming grantees exists when each grantee in
a succession of two or more conveyances of the encumbered property agrees
to assume the mortgage debt. For example, if M, the mortgagor, conveys
to B, who assumes the debt, andB then conveys to R, who assumes the debt,
there is an unbroken chain of assuming grantees. B and R are assuming
grantees, and R is the remote assuming grantee. Under these facts, the rights
and liabilities of the remote assuming grantee are similar to those of the
grantee who takes directly from the mortgagor. 79 The relationship of prin-
cipal and surety arises following each conveyance; the assuming grantee
becomes the principal, and his grantor becomes the surety. 0 Thus, the mort-
gagee could sue under the suretyship-equitable subrogation theory or the
third party beneficiary theory. Under the theory of suretyship-equitable
subrogation, the mortgagee would be subrogated to the rights of each suc-
cessive grantor-surety. 81 Under the third party beneficiary theory, the mor-
76. Young v. Clifford, 61 Mo. App. 450, 452 (St. L. 1895).
77. Missouri courts have not yet decided these questions. Tucker v. Holder,
359 Mo. 1039, 225 S.W.2d 123 (1949), by analogy, would appear to indicate that
the grantor would be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. In Tucker, an assum-
ing grantee took property believing he had received the fee and then paid the mort-
gage debt. In fact, he had received only a life estate. In a quiet title action brought
by the remainderman, the court subrogated the assuming grantee to the rights of
the mortgagee in the land on the basis that a life tenant who discharges encum-
brances on the land is a creditor of the estate. Id. at 1045-46, 225 S.W.2d at 126-27.
Thus, it could be argued that a mortgagor who discharges an encumbrance on the
land should be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against the land.
78. See id. at 1046, 225 S.W.2d at 126-27 ("[S]ubrogation ... is the device
of equity to prevent unjust enrichment and to compel the ultimate discharge of an
obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it.").
79. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, §5.15.
80. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
81. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.15, at 276;
Warm, supra note 4, at 128-29.
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tgagee could sue because a promise is received for his benefit by the grantor-
surety, who is liable to him. 82 The mortgagor and the intermediate assum-
ing grantees have the same rights against the remote assuming grantee as
the original mortgagor has against an assuming grantee who takes directly
from the mortgagor. 83 The intermediate assuming grantee in a suit by the
mortgagee also may have the defenses of extension and release discussed
above.8 4
The problem is more difficult when the chain of assuming grantees is
broken, but the grantee who currently holds the property has assumed the
mortgage. This occurs when the initial grantee or one or more intermediate
grantees have taken the property subject to the mortgage, but have conveyed
to a grantee who has agreed to assume the debt. For example, ifM, the mort-
gagor, conveys to B, who takes subject to the mortgage, .and B then con-
veys to R, who assumes the debt, there is a break in the chain of assuming
grantees. B is not personally liable for the debt because he took only subject
to the mortgage.8 5 Although the mortgagee can reach the mortgaged land
to satisfy the debt,8 6 he may wish to proceed directly against the remote
assuming grantee and hold that grantee personally liable for any deficiency.
The grantee, however, has taken from a grantor who was not personally
liable. In these circumstances, there are problems with both the suretyship-
equitable subrogation and third party beneficiary theories.
In the early Missouri case of Hicks v. Hamilton,8 7 which has been
overruled, 88 the court rejected both the suretyship-equitable subrogation and
third party beneficiary theories. The plaintiff Hicks had obtained a mort-
gage from Clark on property owned by Clark. Clark conveyed the prop-
erty to Cowling subject to the mortgage; Cowling then conveyed to
Hamilton. After default, the plaintiff foreclosed on the land and sued for
82. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.15, at 277.
The mortgagee is a creditor beneficiary because each successive grantor in the chain
of assumptions is liable to him. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Part III.B. supra.
84. Phoenix Trust Co. v. Garner, 227 Mo. App. 929, 930-33, 59 S.W.2d 779,
780-81 (K.C. 1933). See notes 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 4 supra.
86. No agreement between the parties transferring the land will prevent the
mortgagee from reaching the land to satisfy the mortgage debt. G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.1.
87. 144 Mo. 495, 46 S.W. 432 (1898) (overruled in Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo.
262, 269-70, 55 S.W. 863, 865 (En Banc 1900)).
88. Hicks was overruled in Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo. 262, 269-70, 55 S.W.
863, 865 (En Banc 1900). In overruling Hicks, the court allowed recovery on a third
party beneficiary theory. A careful examination of Missouri cases reveals none that
allowed the mortgagee to recover from an assuming grantee who took after a break
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a deficiency remaining on the note. 89 The Hicks court held that the remote
assuming grantee, whose grantor had taken only subject to the mortgage,
could not be personally liable.90 In rejecting the suretyship-equitable subroga-
tion doctrine, the court recognized that the doctrine hinged on the mort-
gagee's ability to enforce the rights that the surety had against the principal. 91
An intermediate nonassuming grantor, however, does not become a surety
when he conveys to an assuming grantee because he never has been per-
sonally liable for the mortgage debt. 92 Thus, the mortgagee would have no
right to subrogation. The Hicks court rejected the third party beneficiary
theory because the plaintiff mortgagee was not a creditor beneficiary; 93 there
was no privity or obligation between the plaintiff mortgagee and the
nonassuming grantor. 94 In Hicks, there was no privity because the nonassum-
ing grantor was not personally liable to the mortgagee. 95
Two years later in Crone v. Stinde,9 6 the Missouri Supreme Court expressly
overruled the Hicks decision and allowed the mortgagee to recover on a third
party beneficiary theory. 97 The Crone court stated that the contract of
assumption9 8 between the nonassuming grantor and the remote assuming
grantee
was made for the benefit of the party holding the mortgage debt,
and as plaintiff is owner and holder of that debt we know of no reason,
why under our rulings, he is not entitled to sue for and recover judg-
ment for the same, notwithstanding ... [the defendant's grantor]
was under no obligation either legal or equitable to pay the debt.99
Missouri courts continue to follow this theory and allow a mortgagee to ob-
tain a personal judgment against an assuming grantee who takes his title
89. Hicks v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. at 496-97, 46 S.W. at 432.
90. Id. at 500, 46 S.W. at 433.
91. Id. at 499, 46 S.W. at 433. See also notes 48-53 and accompanyingtextsupra.
92. 144 Mo. at 499, 46 S.W. at 433. See also Warm, supra note 4, at 133-36.
93. 144 Mo. at 499-500, 46 S.W. at 433.
94. Id.
95. Id. In other words, the mortgagee was an incidental beneficiary.
96. 156 Mo. 262, 55 S.W. 863 (1900).
97. Id. at 269-70, 55 S.W. at 864-65.
98. The Crone court stated, "It ... seems clear that there was a new and
valuable consideration for the promise... [to assume the mortgage debt]." Id.
at 268, 55 S.W. at 864. The court did not make clear what it considered to be the
new consideration. The mortgagee was not a creditor beneficiary as the defendant-
assuming grantee's grantor owed no obligation to the mortgagee. The mortgagee
was probably not a donee beneficiary as it is unlikely that the defendant-assuming
grantee's grantor intended to make a gift to the mortgagee. Therefore, the mort-
gagee was an incidental beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133
(1932). Under traditional third party beneficiary theory, an incidental beneficiary
cannot sue successfully on the promise. See note 54 supra.
99. 156 Mo. at 268-69, 55 S.W. at 864.
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from one not personally liable for the indebtedness. 10 0
The effect of these decisions on the rights and liabilities of the mortgagor
and any assuming grantees who took prior to the break in the chain of
assumptions is unclear. While this problem has not been addressed expressly
in Missouri, their rights and liabilities are probably no different than when
no break in the chain of assumptions exists.101 In Phoenix Trust Co, v. Garner,10 2
the mortgagee sued the assuming grantee of the mortgagor for a deficiency
remaining after foreclosure. The defendant had conveyed the property sub-
ject to the mortgage. A subsequent remote grantee had assumed the mort-
gage, and the plaintiff-mortgagee had given an extension of time for pay-
ment to this subsequent remote assuming grantee without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant. 103 The court found that when the remote grantee
assumed the debt, he became the principal and the defendant became a
surety. 104 The court held that the defendant was not liable apparently because
the mortgagee had not given him the proper notice and, therefore, he had
been released by operation of law. 10 5 This case indicates that courts will treat
the mortgagor and the assuming grantee who takes before the break in the
chain as if the break in the chain had not occurred.
D. Subdivision of Land and the Agreement to Assume
A troublesome problem occurs when the mortgagor conveys a parcel
of the mortgaged property to a grantee who assumes the entire mortgage
debt 06 and, thereafter, the assuming grantee conveys all or part of the parcel
to others. The problem arises when two conditions occur. First, the agree-
ment to assume the entire mortgage debt does not appear in a deed that is
in the chain of title10 7, and second,'the sale of a parcel that the assuming
100. Phoenix Trust Co. v. Garner, 227 Mo. App. 929, 933, 59 S.W.2d 779,
781 (K.C. 1933).
101. See Part II.B. supra.
102. 227 Mo. App. 929, 59 S.W.2d 779 (K.C. 1933).
103. Id. at 930-31, 59 S.W.2d at 780-81.
104. Id. at 933, 59 S.W.2d at 781. The relationship of principal and surety arose
between a remote assuming grantee and a prior assuming grantee who were
separated in the chain of title by persons who had not assumed the note and,
therefore, had no personal liability for its payment.
105. Id. The reasoning of the court is not entirely clear. The decision seems
to be based on an extension that the mortgagee gave to the remote assuming grantee
without the knowledge or consent of the defendant. See id. at 930, 59 S.W.2d at
779-80.
106. The analysis that follows in the text also applies if the grantee assumes
a larger proportion of the mortgage debt than the value of the land he receives bears
to the value of the entire mortgaged tract.
107. Because the problem results from a lack of notice of the amount of the debt
the land is encumbered to discharge, the problem can be eliminated by careful draft-
ing. The terms of the assumption should be stated in the deed. See Peterson &
Eckhardt, supra note 22, § 708.
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grantee conveyed would satisfy more than that parcel's proportionate share
of the debt. Because the agreement to assume the entire mortgage debt does
not appear in the record, subsequent grantees and subsequent mortgagees
do not have notice of it. The problem, however, is not determining the per-
sonal liability of the grantees since, by hypothesis, sale of the mortgaged land
will satisfy the debt. Rather, the problem concerns marshalling of assets: 108
in what order should the parcels be sold at a foreclosure sale? 109
The Missouri Supreme Court faced this problem in Missouri Home Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Allen.1 0 The Aliens had executed a mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff savings and loan on 160 acres of land. The Allens trans-
ferred only the west eighty acres to Greene County Loan Company ("Greene
County Loan"), which agreed to assume the entire mortgage debt."' The
deed to Greene County Loan recited that it took only subject to the mort-
gage and did not mention any agreement to assume. Greene County Loan
thereafter executed deeds of trust in favor of two title insurance companies
to part of the west eighty acres. The issue before the court was whether to
order sale of only the east eighty acres, which the Allens retained, of only
that portion of the west eighty acres in the hands of Greene County Loan,
or of both tracts with each paying its proportionate share to satisfy the mort-
gage debt.1 2
The Allens urged the court to effect the assumption agreement whereby
they would be only sureties and Greene County Loan would be primarily
liable for payment of the debt. 113 The court conceded that an agreement to
assume outside of the deed could be the basis of an assuming grantee's
liability,1 14 but refused enforcement of such an agreement if it would im-
pose obligations on the grantees or lienors of Greene County Loan because
108. Missouri Home Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Allen, 452 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Mo.
1970). When a parcel of a mortgaged tract of land is transferred subject to the mort-
gage, both parcels must contribute to discharge the debt. Hall v. Morgan, 79 Mo.
47, 48-49 (1883).
109. No agreement between the parties transferring the land will prevent the
mortgagee from reaching the land to satisfy the mortgage debt. G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 5.1.
110. 452 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1970).
111. Id. at 110-11. There was evidence of a contract of sale in which Greene
County Loan agreed to assume the entire mortgage debt. In addition, the evidence
included a statement of the consideration given to the Allens at the time of com-
pleting the transaction which recited that Greene County Loan assumed the en-
tire debt as part of the consideration for the transfer. Id. This evidence should have
been sufficient to prove an agreement to assume outside the deed. See notes 34-41
and accompanying text supra.
112. 452 S.W.2d at 110-11.
113. Id. at 111.
114. Id. at 111-12. See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra.
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they had no notice of the agreement. 115 The court stated that subsequent
grantees or lienors of Greene County Loan "were entitled to rely on the pro-
visions of ... [the] recorded deed" 116 and they "properly could consider
that all of the land mortgaged was liable for the payment of the mortgage
debt." 1 7 The court upheld the trial court's order that both tracts be sold." 8
The Allen case is distinguishable from the cases that enforce an agree-
ment to assume the mortgage debt that is outside the deed. When mortgaged
land is conveyed, the land remains the primary fund from which to satisfy
the debt.11 9 In the cases enforcing the outside agreement, the remote grantee
has received the entire mortgaged premises and is, therefore, on notice that
the premises could be used to satisfy the entire mortgage debt. 120 In Allen,
the subsequent grantees received only a portion of the mortgaged premises.
They would expect, therefore, that their property could be used to satisfy
only its proportionate share of the indebtedness.' 2' The Allens were attempt-
ing to use the assumption agreement to require satisfaction of the entire in-
debtedness from the portion of the mortgaged land conveyed to Greene
County Loan but now owned by or mortgaged to others. 22 Enforcement
of the agreement to assume would have doubled the amount of the in-
debtedness that the grantees and lienors of Greene County Loan would have
expected their property could be required to satisfy at foreclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practitioner handling a conveyance of mortgaged land should in-
sist that the agreement, whether it be to assume or to take subject to the mort-
115. 452 S.W.2d at 112. The court stated:
In this case, Aens seek to go beyond their grantee Greene County Loan
and impose obligations on their grantee's grantees lienors, who had no
notice of any agreement between Allens and Greene County Loan except
that stated in Allens' deed to Greene County Loan, namely "subject to
a $45,000 deed of trust."
Id.
116. Id. at 113.
117. Id. at 112. Cf Hall v. Morgan, 79 Mo. 47, 51-52 (1883) (when portion
of tract transferred subject to mortgage, each part remains liable for its proportionate
share of debt).
118. 452 S.W.2d at 113.
119. Id. at 112. If the deed from the Allens to Greene County Loan had con-
tained an assumption clause and if it had been recorded to give notice of the assump-
tion agreement to subsequent purchasers and lienors, then at the foreclosure sale,
the west 80 acres conveyed to Greene County Loan would have been sold first.
Then, the 80 acres that the Aliens retained would have been sold to satisfy the re-
maining indebtedness, if any.
120. See, e.g., cases cited note 11 supra.
121. See notes 114-18 and accompanying text supra.
122. 452 S.W.2d at 110-11.
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gage, be written in the deed and also in a separate written agreement signed
by all parties to the transaction. The separate written agreement usually will
be a prior contract of sale. Recording the deed will eliminate problems of
notice to subsequent grantees, and both instruments will alleviate problems
of proof if it becomes necessary to prove or disprove the existence of an agree-
ment to assume. In addition, the practitioner representing the mortgagee
must be aware of the potential defenses of the mortgagor. In granting an
extension of time for payment to an assuming grantee or releasing a parcel
of the mortgaged premises, the mortgagee always should notify the mort-
gagor and should obtain his consent to the extension or release in a signed
agreement. The extension agreement should contain a reservation of rights
clause in which the mortgagee reserves all rights against the mortgagor. By
taking time to obtain written agreements, careful practitioners can eliminate
many of the problems associated with assumptions of mortgages.
GARY D. MCCONNELL
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